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Recent Developments

Robinson v. State
Statements Made to Internal Affairs Division of a Police Department Are
Discoverable Under Maryland's Version of the Jencks Doctrine
By Anabelle Berges

T

he Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that
statements made to the Internal Affairs
Division of a Maryland police
department are in the possession of
the prosecution, and therefore
discoverable by the defendant for
purposes of cross-examination.
Robinson v. State, 354 Md. 287, 730
A.2d 181 (1999). The court found
that statements made by two police
officers to the Internal Affairs Division
("lAD"), regarding the incident for
which the petitioner was on trial,
should have been disclosed to the
defense for inspection of any
exculpatory or impeaching evidence.
The court ofappeals also held that the
trial judge erred in instructing the jury
regarding the credibility of a witness.
Through this holding, the court
expanded Maryland's version of the
Jencks doctrine to include lAD
statements made by police officers.
The facts of this case were in
dispute. The State offered testimony
from the two investigating officers that
on January 18, 1996, two masked
men entered a 7-11 store in
Forestville, Maryland, and robbed the
store at gunpoint The officers testified
that upon reaching the 7-11 store they
saw two masked men, one later
identified as Ramone Robinson
("Robinson"), exit the store and enter
a vehicle. Officer Smith testified that
the vehicle came straight toward him,
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at which point he fired in the vehicle's
direction. Corporal Hooper testified
that shots were fired by the assailants
at both police officers and that they
returned:fire. The police officers both
testified that Robinson exited the
vehicle with a gun in his hand,
screamed, and fired in their direction.
The police officers fired back at
Robinson, hitting him four times.
Robinson testified that he did not
play any part in the robbery ofthe 711 store, but admitted to driving the
vehicle involved in the incident. He
testified that he was waiting in the
vehicle for his friend to come out of
the 7-11 store. Robinson stated that
shots were fired at him as he drove
away from the store, and that he exited
the vehicle unarmed with his hands
raised.
During cross-examination ofthe
police officers, defense counsel
discovered they had given statements
to the lAD regarding the incident.
Defense counsel then requested the
opportunity to determine if the lAD
statements contained any exculpatory
or impeaching material. Afterdenying
the request and conducting an in
camera review ofthe statements, the
court instructed the jury that the
officers were cleared of any
wrongdoing, and that the lAD
statements contained no exculpatory
material. The jury requested the court
to defme "exculpatory", to which the

court answered "it means free from
guilt ... the opposite of guilty."
Robinson was thereafter
convicted of assault with intent to
murder, robbery with a dangerous
w~apon, and other related offenses
by a jury in the Circuit Court for
Prince George's County. Robinson
appealed to the court of special
appeals, which affirmed the lower
court's decision, holding that "the
statement is confidential under state
law, and developed for nonprosecutorial purposes, and held by
a division of a law enforcement
agency that is not working in
conjunction with the prosecutor." The
Court of Appeals of Maryland
granted certiorari.
The court of appeals began its
analysis by explaining the current law
regarding disclosure ofJencks/Carr
material. Through Carr, Maryland
adopted the "underlying principals"
ofthe United States Supreme Court's
holding in Jencks, recognizing that
defense counsel must be afforded the
opportunity to effectively crossexamine a witness to determine
whether their testimony is inconsistent
with prior written statements.
Robinson, 354 Md. at 300-01,730
A.2d at 188 (citing Jencks v. United
States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957); Carr
v. State, 284 Md. 455, 397 A.2d
606 (1979)). The Supreme Court in
Jencks held that after the direct
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examination ofa prosecution witness,
defense counsel may request the
prosecution to produce all written
reports or statements made by the
witness regarding their testimony. Id
at 301, 730 A.2d at 188.
Following the Jencks decision,
Congress created the "Jencks Act,"
18 U.S.c. § 3500 (1994). Id at 303,
730 A.2d at 189-90. Although
Maryland has not wholly adopted the
Jencks Act, Maryland courts
frequently use it as an analytical guide.
Id at 303, 730 A.2d at 190 (citing
Kanaras v. State, 54 Md. App. 568,
460 A.2d 61 (1983)). The Jencks
Act requires that for a witness's
statement or report to be
discoverable, the following
requirements must be shown: (1 ) the
witness must testify on direct
examination; (2) defense counsel must
request the statement; (3) the
statement must qualify as a
discoverable statement; (4) the
statement must relate to the subject
matter ofthe witness's testimony; and
(5) the statement must be in the
possession of the prosecution. Id at
319-20, 730 A.2d at 198.
The court of appeals continued
its analysis by stating thatthe only issue
in the present case was whether the
prosecutor was in possession of the
officers' lAD statements, making
them discoverable. Id at 304, 730
A.2d at 190. The court noted that
many courts have considered the
police department to be an arm ofthe
prosecution, therefore requiring
prosecutors to sometimes produce
written reports or statements in the
department's possession. Id.
However, because oftheir confidential

nature,jurisdictions are divided on
whether the lAD of a police
department is part ofthe prosecutorial
"arm." Id. at 305, 730 A.2d at 190.
In the instant case, the court held that
the lAD was part of the police
department and, therefore, an arm of
the prosecution. Id at 309, 730A.2d
at 192-93. As such, the statements
and records were in the possession
of the police department, and
therefore constructively in the
possession of the prosecution. Id.
The prosecution argued that
because the lAD statements were
confidential, it did not have possession
of those statements. Id. at 306-07,
730 A.2d at 191. In response, the
court held that confidentiality, not
possession, dictated whether or not
the statements were discoverable. Id.
at 309, 730 A.2d at 192. Moreover,
the court must balance the
"confidentiality interest ... against the
confrontation and due process rights
ofthe defendant." Id. at 309, 730
A.2d at 193. The court also noted
that although the lAD statements
were confidential, the defendant's
right to due process was fundamental,
and therefore more important. Id at
308, 730 A.2d at 192. (citing Chief,
Montgomery County Dep't of
Police v. Jacocks, 50 Md.App. 132,
144,436 A.2d 930,936-37 (1981)).
The court next addressed
whether or not the trial judge's in
camera review ofthe lAD statements
was proper. Id. at 311-13, 730 A.2d
at 193-94. The State, relying onZaal
v. State, 326 Md. 54, 602 A.2d
1247 (1992), and the Jencks Act,
argued that an in camera review is
an alternative available to the court

when dealing with confidential
records. Id. at 311-12, 730 A.2d at
1<94. The court rejected this
argument, stating that Jencks and
Carr held that only defense counsel
can properly determine if statements
contain inconsistencies for purposes
of cross-examination. Id at 312-13,
730 A.2d at 194-95. The court added
that because the instant case was
largely a credibility battle between
Robinson and the police officers,
defense counsel had an even greater
need for the officers' lAD statements.
Id. at 313, 730 A.2d at 195. As such,
the prosecution had a legal duty to
submit the lAD statements to the
defense. Id at 313, 730 A.2d at 195.
Finally, in focusing on the trial
court's instruction to the jury
regarding the lAD statements, the
court concluded that it was the jury's
task to judge the credibility of a
witness. Id. "[T]he general rule is
that it is error for the court to make
remarks in the presence of the jury
reflecting upon the credibility of a
witness .... " Id at 314, 730 A.2d
at 195 (citing Elmer v. State, 239
Md. 1, 209 A.2d 776 (1965)).
Accordingly, the court of appeals
determined that the circuit court
improperly instructed the jury
regarding the officers' wrongdoing and
the lack ofexculpatory evidence in the
lAD statements. Id. at 315-16, 730
A.2d at 196. As a result, the court of
appeals held that the jury instruction
constituted prejudicial error by the trial
court. Id. at 317, 730 A.2d at 196.
The court's decision highlights
the importance for defense counsel to
have discovery available in order to
effectively cross-examine prosecution
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witnesses and to detennine whether
any evidence is exculpatory. More
importantly, the court of appeals has
emphasized the significance of the
defendant's due process rights when
balanced against the confidentiality of
the infonnation sought. This decision
has expanded the discovery available
to a defendant, and has thus allowed
access to certain information that
could change the way police officers
are cross-examined by defense
counsel.
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